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OpEd: Looming questions about transparent leadership coming from the Nova Scotia shooting inquiry
June 28, 2022
Visitors pay their repects at a memorial honouring the victims of the April 2020 murder rampage in rural Nova Scotia, in Victoria Park in Truro, N.S

In April 2020, a man dressed as an RCMP officer and driving a mocked-up RCMP car, shot and killed 22 people in rural Nova Scotia. Three others were wounded. This horrendous act of violence completely shocked communities, a province and a nation to their core.

Many questions followed from concerned community members, the media, grieving families and governments at all levels. How did this happen? Why? Could it have been prevented or stopped sooner? Could the public have been better warned? All valid enquiries undoubtedly, many of them directed at the police of jurisdiction, the RCMP.


This was the largest murder spree in Canadian history and occurred at 16 locations over an immense geographic area. The killer set fires at many of the shooting locations; changed clothing and vehicles at times; and evaded police for half of a day before being shot and killed by two RCMP officers at a rural gas station.


There were but a handful of officers working in that jurisdiction when the mayhem began that evening. Many others were called in to assist over the 13-hour ordeal, from far away RCMP detachments and provincial headquarters units. One RCMP officer was killed and another injured by gunfire early in the series of events. The whole traumatic event hit the involved officers very hard of course. The series of deaths and destruction they witnessed that night was not dissimilar to a theatre of war. It would have been a policing challenge for any police force on the continent, let alone for a small contingent in a large policing jurisdiction.


The RCMP are Canada’s federal police from coast to coast, but in eight provinces they are also under contract to be local police in many jurisdictions as well as the “provincial police”. That is the policing environment existing in Nova Scotia.


It is not a secret in the Canadian policing world that the RCMP are very short of staff in their contract provinces. National security priorities have reportedly drained RCMP provincial staffing complements, causing many detachments to be crucially short of personnel compared to officer workload.



The RCMP has conducted an extensive investigation including the forensic examination of numerous crime scenes, to attempt to learn everything they can about the killer Gabriel Wortman, including his history of violence and the motive behind this mass murder; the origin of the involved firearms and ammunition; who might have known or been involved; and much more, including their own response and decision-making issues within. Police services always conduct an After-Action Review following any major event, including command and control; resources; policies and training issues that may require changes in order to more effectively face similar events in future.

Undoubtedly, despite trying their very best to protect and save lives and capture a killer that night, mistakes would have been made. Not with any malice, but human beings under intense duress will make errors – some inconsequential, and some critical. And this was the biggest and worst event any police officer in Canada has ever faced. That isn’t meant to excuse mistakes, but to put the reality of the challenge into context.

On top of public criticism of the RCMP in terms of their response to Gabriel Wortman’s senseless reign of terror, looms allegations of leadership failings within the senior management of the RCMP and most recently, against the commissioner, then minister of public safety and the prime minister. It is important to note that RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki, Minister Bill Blair and PM Justin Trudeau all deny allegations against them.


The Mass Casualty Commission (MCC) was announced in late 2000 to conduct an independent examination of the Nova Scotia murders and response, and to make recommendations to protect communities in future. In short, the mandate of the MCC is to examine the responses of involved law enforcement and government programs.


The MCC subpoenaed documents from several agencies, including the RCMP, for examination and analysis, which is an exhaustive process. Witness interviews followed, some conducted in-camera by investigators and others by MCC commissioners on video. The subpoenas are not permissive. Agencies must produce all documents and not cherry-pick what is relevant.


Over the past few months criticisms of RCMP managers and executives, within the RCMP’s “H” Division (Nova Scotia) and headquarters (Ottawa) have risen and are disconcerting.


RCMP member frustrations over decision-making procedures among supervisors and managers during the hunt for Wortman have risen through the testimony of RCMP witnesses.


The Corporal in-charge of the “H” Division Emergency Response Team (ERT) was highly disapproving of management surrounding the lack of technology and air support faced by ERT members. He was also critical regarding what he viewed as a lack of emotional health support for his members by his management team, testifying that the situation was “disgusting.” Even more damning was his assertion that the RCMP is a “broken organization.”


The number of known deceased victims released to the public in the days following the murders by RCMP senior management came under dispute between lower-level officers and managers.


Most significantly, this past week, the MCC revealed that four pages of notes taken by Supt. Darren Campbell, a prominent RCMP figure in the investigation, were not provided in the disclosure and only handed over when the MCC expressed their valid concern about the omission. Who removed them and why is yet to be made clear, but no other notes are suspected to have been held back.


Campbell is a respected investigator, having served across Canada. These personal notes were written by him during an April 28, 2020 phone call between himself, A/Commissioner Lee Bergerman and Lia Scanlan, the RCMP’s civilian director of strategic communications, with Commissioner Lucki and others in Ottawa, in which Lucki expressed her displeasure that information regarding two of the firearms Wortman used in the murderous rampage was not publicly released as per her direction. The allegation is that Lucki had specifically instructed Strategic Communications to release that information in a press conference, but they did not. According to Campbell’s notes, Lucki claimed that she had promised the Minister of Public Safety and the PM that this information would be released to assist them with forthcoming firearms legislation, which was subsequently released within days of the telephone admonishment. Campbell admitted that he had instructed the communications personnel to not release the information out of fear that the release would jeopardize ongoing investigations into those firearms. In my opinion that seems like a well-reasoned position for an experienced homicide investigator to take early in an investigation. Campbell also wrote that some in the meeting "were reduced to tears and emotional over this belittling reprimand."

Of course, this disclosure raised much criticism and media coverage, leading the commissioner, Minister Blair and the PM to all express concern and confusing denials that stated that they did not interfere in the investigation. Lucki did subsequently say that she regretted the tone of that telephone call but stood firm that she had not made the statements claimed by Campbell.



In my view, Supt. Campbell put his career in great peril when he made the notes about his commissioner. If the notes were contrived, the move was complete insanity. If they were accurate, he was the pillar of integrity. I suspect the latter, particularly given that his immediate boss, Bergerman, was with him and made some similar notes. And the nagging question in my view is what would be the motive for either of them to risk their careers by making false notes about their boss at that time? The true test will be when Bergerman (now retired) and Campbell both testify under oath at the MCC. Will they risk criminal charges of perjury by sticking to that story if it isn’t true? I think not.

As far as the minister and PM go, who knows. It’s certainly not the first time the PM has been dimly viewed in a “he said, she said” situation (i.e. SNC Lavalin). Will every aide to them support their version if asked? Some of them are very young and have long careers ahead of them.

Will Commissioner Lucki continue to stick to her story that she didn’t say it and that government didn’t ask her to? Will others in the room with her at the time support her version of the events? They’ll certainly risk all if they do and if it isn’t true. Regardless, it has become a public battle between some top officers in the force and the timing isn’t pretty.


RCMP member morale is extremely low across the country due to a variety of working condition and public controversy issues. Some municipalities and some whole provinces are actively examining alternative policing options. From member and community trust perspectives this is not at all good.


PM Trudeau and a few ministers are already surrounded by finger-pointers regarding their inconsistent statements concerning the Emergencies Act enactment last winter.


The bottom line here in terms of Brenda Lucki, Bill Blair and Prime Minster Trudeau is that true leadership should be about honesty, integrity and trust, and involves making decisions that are in the best interest of those being served and being led, and NOT about misleading or lying to those groups to protect the career(s) of the so-called leader.



Somebody isn’t telling the truth in this mess. It’s time for that person or persons to belly up to bar, be honest with those being served (Canadians) and those being led (the men and women of the RCMP) and fall on a proverbial sword or two.


Canadians and RCMP members alike deserve that from their leaders. Anything else is a complete failure of leadership.

Chris Lewis served as Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police from 2010 until he retired in 2014. He can be seen regularly on CTV and CP24 giving his opinion as a public safety analyst.

Leadership involves risk, especially in policing

By Chris Lewis • March 28, 2026
Leadership is inundated with risk, every hour of every day, in all sectors. In policing, legislative authorities and established policy are the ever-present guideposts, but occasionally policy just doesn’t apply. At times someone has to just make a decision to do something, or not, or they will fail the public they serve and the personnel it is their duty to lead. If it goes bad, time to own up, do damage control, learn from it and move forward. It always frightened me when I saw some at the senior executive level in policing think that supervisors and managers operate in a pristine little bubble where nothing should ever go wrong. Then when it did because some supervisor tried their best to make something work for all the right reasons, they wanted to pigeon-hole the person that took the risk. There were times during my own career when executives were not encouraged to take any risk either. In fact, taking risk was career risk in itself. Despite the best of intentions, if it went bad, the one ‘responsible’ be forever labelled as having failed. Even if the gamble went well, the jaundiced eyes from above would still forever look at them as being a potential liability. It became the “Oh, him. He’s the one that...” At times the daily decision making of high-level commanders would be second-guessed by those in the executive suites – some of whom had never really commanded anything. My buddy retired Chief Wayne Frechette used to describe these folks as: “They’ve never been out after dark on company time.” I know this same concept was alive in many other police services. Some at executive levels actually did serve in operational roles at some point but they never took a risk. Somehow, they were fortunate to skate through difficult situations through sheer luck as opposed to good decision-making and never developed any scar tissue along the way. They didn’t learn from failure – they survived by luck. They also were viewed by weak executives above them as being golden because there was never a milli-second of negativity around them. They were Teflon. But those that worked under their “command” (for lack of a better word) had no respect for them. They simply watched them walk around with coffee in hand, never leaving the office or making a decision. It wasn’t leadership, but it did pave the way to stardom from on high, for some. True leaders do take risks at times. Many I worked with and for did it all and did it well. They did so in the best interests of those they served and those they led, because it wasn’t about themselves, but was done in the service of those that placed their trust in them. Policy simply doesn’t fit every situation. It is most often a guide that anticipates most circumstances that employees will face, particularly the more common (high-frequency) ones. But it cannot predict every possible scenario. When that happens in policing, it can occur in very unlikely situations (low-frequency) that are incredibly high-risk. Supervisors cannot say “Sorry folks, the book doesn’t cover this one” and run away crying. They also don’t have time to tell bad guys, “Hey big fella, sit tight. We need to take a pause here and get the whiteboard out so we can have a group-think about how to stop your murderous rampage.” I think that many pseudo-leaders – far too many, are afraid to make risky decisions out of fear that an error will jeopardize their career. Instead, they risk their careers by not making decisions. Or as I like to say: “their fear of career-risk, risks their careers.” This can be fatal in the policing world. When a police supervisor shirks their responsibilities or quivers, sucks their thumb, and prays for the situation to go away, thankfully constables will come forward and do their best to get their teammates through it. Sometimes that ends well and when the supervisor emerges from their fear-induced coma, they will more often than not take credit for the success. But when the situation goes to hell-in-a-handbasket – despite best efforts, the pseudo-leader will document the risk-taking employee and add another bullet-point to their list of things they’ve done to “hold people accountable.” The panel at their next promotional interview will likely hear the false rendition proudly told. I hear examples of this practise from serving police officers across North America on a much too frequent basis. True leaders develop a culture of trust among those they lead that their suggestions and feedback are encouraged and valued. Their confidence that the leader wants their input encourages them to constantly analyze situations and give thought to what policy says and the options available when policy says nothing. That is good for the employee’s development and may save the leader’s hind-end and the continuity of the team on occasion when an employee steps forward in a crisis. Having said that, there will clearly be situations where there isn’t time for the whiteboard, and a decision needs to be made by the responsible “leader.” When it doesn’t work out, the real leader will step forward and be accountable. But when it does go well, the true leader will allow the light to shine on the team they have the honour to lead. In my view, we’re not seeing enough of that in North American policing. We need more genuine leaders at all levels of law enforcement organizations. Developing and promoting real leaders that can manage risk effectively is a must. Anything less fails everyone.

Why Joint Forces Operations Are No Longer Optional

By Chris Lewis • March 26, 2026
They used to be simply a "nice to have."

Police investigating police: Is there another option?

By Chris Lewis • March 18, 2026
The March 17 th announcement by the Toronto Police Service (TPS) regarding the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigation into allegations by an Ontario Justice that three TPS officers colluded and lied during a 2024 murder trial against a man that ran over and killed TPS Constable Jeffrey Northrup in 2021, has further inflamed the debate over who should investigate alleged police wrongdoing. This instance combined with the recent arrests and ongoing police investigation into several TPS officers for their alleged involvement with organized crime, has brought this discussion to a boiling point. I appreciate the public perceptions around this investigative model given that the average citizen doesn’t necessarily understand the professionalism and commitment of police investigative teams like the recent OPP Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) group. I have all the confidence the world in that team, but I also personally know the ability and integrity of the OPP Detective Inspector in-charge. So, if these investigations aren’t carried out by police, who will do them? They do not fall under the mandate of the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (SIU), which by the way is largely comprised of former police criminal investigators and forensic identification experts, many of whom investigated homicides in police services. For SIU to assume a larger role, they would have to grow exponentially and expand their team of ‘former cops’. These cases generally do not fall under the purview of Ontario’s Inspectorate of Policing either. They would loosely fall under the oversight role of Ontario’s Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA), who is responsible for receiving, managing and overseeing public complaints against police, but frankly they don’t have mandate or the horsepower to conduct complex criminal investigations. They oversee the “public complaints” that may lead to a criminal investigation, but the investigation would be the responsibility of a police service to conduct. An expansion of the LECA would require a tremendous amount of funding and human resources, most of whom would also be former police officers. Hiring and training civilians to conduct such investigations is an option, but largely an incomprehensible one. Police criminal investigators are trained officers that generally start out as uniformed officers responding to occurrences and investigating more routine and less serious crimes, i.e. minor assaults and property crimes. They build investigative expertise over time, including in interviewing and interrogation; gathering and securing physical evidence; legal processes like obtaining judicial authorizations; presenting evidence in court; and various investigative strategies. They learn how to work with special police units that provide specific investigative skills, and more. All of this doesn’t happen overnight, but over a period of years and with the tutelage of more experienced investigators along that journey. Trying to turn a group of young and well-educated civilians – no matter how intelligent and well-intended, into a team of elite investigators, would be a complete disaster and unfair to the public or to the officers being investigated. Over my many years as a member or as the Director of the OPP CIB, my colleagues and I investigated criminal allegations against cops from other agencies. Before the SIU was formed, we investigated officers from many Ontario police services – large and small, who had used deadly force. Many were cleared and a number were arrested and charged. We also investigated criminal allegations against police chiefs in Ontario. Again, several were appropriately cleared, and some were brought before the courts. Municipal, provincial and federal elected officials were similarly investigated and some charged. Our members also investigated police officers in other provinces, including high-ranking ones. I personally investigated two Royal Newfoundland Constabulary officers that were involved in an arrest that result in the death of a suspect. They were properly exonerated, but I would have charged them in a heartbeat if they had wrongfully killed than man. I arrested an OPP Sergeant for sexual assault. A CIB colleague investigated and arrested two different OPP officers for criminal offences. Both of those officers had been personal friends of mine and years later committed suicide. There are tons of similar examples that I can refer to over my career. All of these involved the oversight and legal analysis of a Crown Attorney, sometimes from another province. The interesting thing, and what most of the anti-police folks will never believe, is that in every single one of those investigations, the dialogue that I was involved in with other officers that I worked with or supervised, involved doing what was right. In other words, “If the allegation is substantiated, we will put the case together, arrest them and put them before the courts.” Not even once, did we think about or do anything that would give an officer a pass when they committed a criminal offence. Never. I have every confidence in the world that the vast majority of municipal and RCMP colleagues across Canada would operate under the same guiding principle. Has the occasional officer worked in conflict with that approach? Undoubtedly. Were some investigators not as committed or capable as they should be and perhaps did a poor investigation accidentally or deliberately? Quite likely so. But I truly believe those cases are the exception, not the rule in criminal investigations. Where I more often believe poor investigations or deliberate attempts to inappropriately give a colleague a break continues to occur, is in Police Act investigations, where policy or employee harassment wrongdoings are suspected. I like to think that the focus on that continues to improve, but not fast enough in some cases. Sadly, I know now that unbeknownst to me at the time, it happened under my watch. A focus for my next article. The public and police deserve the very best of investigators to ensure that bad cops are effectively put out of business and good officers are cleared. If there’s another effective option that would appease the doubting public – aside from using current officers from other agencies or creating a new and costly entity that would be staffed by former police officers, I’d like to hear it.